EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
SIMSCPTI P ur . *U R. SINU W I WIS, 3 i CENTS.
EDITORIAL BOARD.
CHARLES E. HART, JR., 1910, Chairman.
FRANK KENNA, Graduate, THOMAS C. MALLEY, 19ro,
Business Manager.. Secretary.
JAMES D. BAIRD, 1910 CLARENCE R. HALL, i910
HOWARD F. BISHOP, i9IO EI.Dox L. HiLDITcH, i910
WILLAM E. COLLINS, 191o THOMAS A. THACHER, 191o
ARTHUR M. COMLEY, 1910 C. KENNETH WYNNE, 1910
Published. monthly during the Academic year, by students of the Yale Law School.
P. O. Address, Box 893, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.
If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of
his subscription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a
continuation of the subscription is desired.
CONFESSION PROCURED THROUGH DECEPTION.
In the recent case of People of the State of New York v. William
Scott, N. Y. Law Journal, Vol. XLI, No. 28, the Court of Appeals of the
State of New York again helped lay the ghost of that theory by whcih
confessions were sought to be avoided not because there was a legal
ground for doing so but because of the moral ground.
On a trial for homicide the defendant's confession, which was re-
ceived in evidence, had been obtained in the manner following: The wit-
ness, one of defendant's neighbors, after going to the jail in which de-
fendant was confined, proposed that they should be handcuffed together
and go into the woods where the deceased had been last seen alive. The
witness promised the defendant that if he (the defendant) would point out
the place where the body was concealed, he should be released by the wit-
ness and allowed to escape. To this the defendant agreed; and they went
to the woods, handcuffed together. On their journey, the sheriff who was
accompanying the witness, drew from the defendant further details of
the crime. Before discovering the body the defendant demanded that he be
released, but instead he was taken back to jail. The transaction throughout
was secretly aided by the sheriff and was consented to by the district at-
torney. The Court of Appeals confirmed the lower courts in holding
that there had been no error committed in receiving evidence of the
confession. See Code of Grim. Pro., Sec. 395. The sheriff and witness
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had gone to the district attorney and asked if there were any objection to
the scheme being carried out. He had replied, "I do not believe you
can do any such thing. If you can, it is all right."
A few cases in different jurisdictions question the admissability of
evidence obtained by the aid of a confession improperly obtained. The
authorities appear to be very conflicting as to the admissability of a
confession otherwise inadmissable, where facts disclosed thereby are
found to be true, some holding that the entire confession is thereby
rendered admissable, some that only the part relating to such facts is
admissable. Almost all courts however agree that the facts discovered by
aid of the confessi6n are themselves admissable and that evidence is also
admissable to show they were discovered in consequence of the confession.
There are to be found a few statements to the effect that if the confession
was obtained by criminal violence the facts discovered might not be admis-
sable, and some expressions to the effect that if the confession was im-
properly obtained by violence or otherwise, the facts discovered by means
thereof ought not to be admitted.
In State v. Roberts. 12 N. C. (I Dev. L.) 259, there is an obiter dictum
in which the judge declared that if it were not for authority, he should say
that where the facts had been obtained by extorted confessions, such
facts may be proved, but nothing which the prisoner said in regard there-
to, and also if it were not for the same authority he should say that not
even the fact of recovery by means of the confession would be admissable.
In Jordan v. State, 32 Miss. 382, the court stated that the rule pro-
tecting against a confession extorted by lawless violence protected the
accused against testimony which could only be discovered or made avail-
able through the instrumentality of such a confession. However, as
physical violence was the basic cause of the above utterance, the rule as
stated there is in nowise applicable to the case before us. State v. William,
Scott, supra.
So, too, in Rusher v. State, 94 Ga. 363, the court held that if criminal
violence, such as a whipping, were used, such evidence as was discov-
ered through such means might be inadmissable, as one crime ought not
to be committed to discover another.
Yet, there can be no serious doubt to the proposition that the great
weight of authority is to the effect that evidence obtained by aid of a
confession is admissable, if relevant, regardless of the manner in which
the confession was obtained. Almost the only exception to the ad-
missability of such evidence is when the thing discovered is not identified
even here, however, some courts hold that the confession itself sufficiently
identifies the property and in other cases the question of identity does not
seem to have been raised. ,Belote v. State, 36 Miss. 96; U. S. v. Richard, 2
Cranch C. C. 439, Fed. Cas. No. I6,154.
In Harvey's case, 2 East. C. L. 658, Lord Eldon said that when the
knowledge of any fact was obtained from a prisoner under such a
promise as excluded the confession from being given in evidence, he should
direct an acquittal unless the fact itself, which was proven, would have
been sufficient to warrant the conviction without the confession.
COMMENTS.
The principle upon which a confession is treated as sometimes in-
admissable is that under certain conditions it becomes untrustworthy as
testimony. This principle is also to be found in the common law.
Parke B., famed for his knowledge and application of the rules of evi-
dence, once stated: "Unless the person attempting to obtain a confession
has the power, apparent to the confessor, to carry out the threat or the
promise, there is no reason for treating the inducement as likely to produce
an untrue confession. In such a case it is not due to inducement, but
to the confessor's own discretion. In all cases inquiry should be made
whether the defendant spoke through fear or in the expectation of
immunity. The test seems to be whether the prisoner had any inducement
to tell a falsehood against himself or felt compelled to speak for any rea-
son when he preferred to remain silent. Balto v. People, 8o N, Y. 484.
In People v. White, 176 N. Y. 349, where the confession to the under-
sheriff was made to him not as a public officer, but as a supposed friend,
the confession was admitted.
In the case of Cox %,. People, 8o N. Y. 5oo, it was held that it is
not sufficient to exclude a confession by a prisoner, as we have formerly
held "that he was under arrest at the time or that it was made to the
officer in whose custody he was or in answer to questions put to
him, or that it was made under the hope or promise of a benefit of a
collateral nature."
Section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of New York pro-
vides that "a confession of a defendant, whether in the course of judicial
proceedings or to a private person, can be given in evidence against
him, unless made under the influence of fear produced by threats or
unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney that he shall
not be prosecuted therefor. . . ." The promise of a neighbor witness,
even conceded to be an agent of the district attorney, to allow the prisoner
to escape while in the woods, can hardly be construed to come within
the provision, . . . "unless made upon a stipulation of the district
attorney that he shall not be prosecuted therefor. . . 2" The New York
courts did not think the case under discussion to be included either with-
in the meaning or spirit of the legislative act alone, and to the same
effect have been the interpretations of similar legislative enactments by
the great majority of the various State courts in cases of the same cir-
cumstances.
The spirit which prompted the court to speak in People v. Wentz, 37
N. Y. 303, was, doubtless, that same spirit which prompted the court in
People v. William Scott, supra, to make use in a specific instance of that
spirit of the law which, while jealous that no legal disadvantage be im-
posed upon an accused, is also jealous that justice be done. Well did
the court in People v. Wentz. supra, summarize that spirit when they
stated that "cautious and hesitating as courts have always been in regard
to confessions made by a person when under arrest to those in authority
over him, they have not gone so far as to exclude them, simply because
they were procured by deception, provided they were voluntarily made."
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THE RIGHTS OF NON-RESIDENT ALIENS UNDER LORD CAMPBELL'S ACT.
Th history of the very early stages of mankind reveals the fact that
even then there existed the idea that compensation or punishment was
due for the death of a man to certain survivors. In our own common
law, while yet in the making, the Saxons allowed were gild, varying
in amount from the comparatively small sum for the death of a peasant,
up to an amount sufficiently fitting for the death of a king. Blackstone
states that a process was given for such a recovery to the party to whom
the injury had been done. Book IV, I88. The exact time at which the
use of were gild ceased to be of use is not positively known, but after it
had fallen into disuse, a common law rule sprang up that an action
for damages could only be maintained against a person for causing the
death of another, and this common law rule held until the passage of
The Fatal Accidents Act (1846), 9 and 10 Vict. C. 93, commonly known
as Lord Campbell's Act. The various State acts in the United States
are, in general, fashioned after the English pattern, and it is believed
by the writer that they are all the same in regard to the rights of suit
given to aliens. As in Lord Campbell's act there is no express pro-
vision giving the right of action to a non-resident alien. In fact, no
line is drawn between citizens and aliens. It is through this lack of a
specific giving of the right to aliens that an ever growing line of deci-
sions has arisen, some jurisdictions allowing, others denying the right of
action by a non-resident alien.
In the recent case of Maria G. R. Maiorano v. Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Company, 29 Supreme Ct. Rep. 424, the U. S. Supreme Court
confirmed-as it was necessary to do under the circumstances where a
State statute has been construed by the highest State court-a decision of
the Pennsylvania courts, whereby the right of recovery was denied a
non-resident alien, subject of the King of Italy. At the same time the
Supreme Federal Court declared that stipulations securing equality with
the natives to the citizens of each of the contracting parties in respect
of protection and security of person and property, contained in the
treaty of November 18, 1871, 17 State at L. 845, between the United
States and Italy, do not require a State to give the non-resident alien
relatives of an Italian subject a right of action for damages for his death,
although such action is afforded to native resident relatives, and although
the existence of such an action may indirectly promote his safety. The
court recognized the fact that, doubtless, one reason which has in-
duced legislators to give to surviving relatives an action for death has
been the hope that care for life would be stimulated. The Massachusetts
Court in Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, held the amount recoverable
to be dependent upon the degree of culpability o fthe negligent person.
Another reason for such legislation, quite as potent, was the desire to
secure compensation to those who might be supposed to suffer directly
and materially by the death. This thought seems to have been upper-
most in Pennsylvania, according to the courts of that State in a line
of decisions. Assuming that the purposes and effect of this kind of
legislation had both views in mind, and assuming that both might be
calculated in some degree to increase the protection and security of per-
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sons who may be exposed to dangers, the court in Maiorano v. Railroad,
supra, is of the opinion that "the protection and security thus afforded is
so indirect and remote thatthe contracting powers cannot fairly be
thought to have had them in contemplation," and hence, that the treaty
between the United States and Italy is in no sense infringed upon.
Except for Lord Campbell's act, it must be conceded that the
representatives of an alien, killed by the negligence of a United States
subject, cannot maintain an action for the death. Lord Campbell's act
gives a new cause of action. The Vera Cruz, io App. Cas. 67. It is a
firmly established principle of the English law that acts of Parliament,
as a general proposition, do not apply to aliens, at least if they be not even
temporarily resident in England, unless the language of the statute is
such as to expressly refer to them. See the opinions of Dr. Lushington in
The Zollverein (1856), Swabey 96; also Lord Esher, in Colquhoum v. Hed-
don (i89o), 25 Q. B. at P. 135; and to the same effect Jervis, C. J., in
the case of Jefferys v. Boosey (1854), 4 A. L. at p. 946, states the law
thus: "Statutes must be understood in general to apply to those only
who owe obedience to the laws, and whose interests it is the duty of the
Legislature to protect; natural born subjects and persons domiciled or
resident within the kingdom owe obedience to the laws of the kingdom,
and are within the benefits conferred by the Legislature; but no duty can
be imposed upon aliens resident abroad, and with them the Legislature of
this country has no concern, either to protect their interests or to con-
trol their rights." And so, in Adam v. British and Foreign Steamship
Comapny AvRTRQ, 2 Q. B. 430; 67 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 844, it was held that
there is nothing in Lord Campbell's act to show that it was intended to
apply for the benefit of foreigners, not residing within the kingdom of
Great Britain. That there was no implied and certainly no express inten-
tion of Parliament to be collected from the statutes to give to foreigners
out of the jurisdiction a right of action which even British subjects did
not possess until the passage of Lord Campbell's Act, 62, as Darling J.
in Adam v. Steamship Co., supra, has tersely stated, "An act of the
British Parliament is not an allocution addressed urbi it orbi."
Furthermore, many of the various statutes, as does the British statute
in S. 2, provide for the division of the damages recovered among the
several persons to be benefitted in proportion to be assessed by the jury.
It can not reasonably be presumed that it was the intention of the
several legislatures to cast upon juries such a duty in regard to the dis-
tant family of a decedent resident alien, there being no express provision to
that effect.
The Pennsylvania courts in Deni v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. (1897),
181 Pa. St. 525, held that under the act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 309, which
gives a right to recover damages for an injury causing death, a non-
resident alien mother has no standing to maintain an action against a
citizen of Pennsylvania to recover damages for the death of her son.
The statute giving the right having no extra territorial force, the plain-
tiff is not within the purview of it. This was, probably the first time that
the direct question came up for decision, and the decision was based
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upon the same line of reasoning which controlled the decision in Adam v.
British and Foreign S. S. Co., supra.
The Massachusetts court in the case of Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass.
266 (May 31, i9oo), seems to have based their opinion, in which they
allow a recovery, upon the ground that the statute is in the nature of a
penalty. The court says, inter alia: "In other words, it is primarily a
penalty for the protection of the life of a workman in this State." Now,
if Lord Campbell's Act, in Massachusetts, be a penal statute, it cannot
be enforced beyond the territory in and for which, it was enacted, ac-
cording to the doctrine laid down in Richardson's Admrs. v; N. Y. C. R. R.
Co., 98 Mass. 89. Yet the court, while recognizing the fact that legisla-
tive power is territorial, and that no duties can be imposed by statute
upon persons who are within the limits of another State, the court here
holds that rights can be offered to such persons and if the power that
governs those extra territorial persons makes no objection, there is noth-
ing to hinder the acceptance of what is offered.
In the case of Vetalora v. Perkins, et. al., 1oi Fed. C. C. (Dist. Mass.,
April 17, igoo), it was held that the Massachusetts act which gives the
right of recovery merely takes away a common law obstacle to a recov-
ery for an admitted tort and should receive a liberal construction. The
court in this case appears to have overlooked the line of reasoning em-
ployed in Adam v. Steamship Co., supra, the basis of Deni v. Railroad,
supra.
The case of Kellyville Coal Co. v. Petraytis, 195 Ill. 215, allowed a re-
covery in a suit based upon a mining law, within that political authority,
the provisions of which were largely in the nature of a police regula-
tion. So, too, the case of Luke v. Calhoun County, 52 Ala. 118, can be
fully distinguished as being based upon a statute which was purposed to
suppress crime and to punish criminal acts.
In Braunigan, et. al., v. Union Gold Mit. Co., 93 Fed. Rep. 164 C. C.
Dist. Colo., March 1i, 1899, it was held, the case apparently being based
upon Deni v. R. R., supra, that non-resident aliens are not entitled to
the benefit of the Colorado statute giving a right of action for death by
wrongful act to the next of kin of the deceased, and cannot maintain an
action thereunder.
The Minnesota Court, in the case of Reinlund v. Commodore Mining
Co. (i9o3), Minn. 89, p. 41, construed the statute of that State as in-
cluding non-resident aliens within the benefits conferred by the statute.
In the case of McMillan v. Spider Co., IH5 Wis. 332, the court after
allowing to plaintiff to be non-suited states that question is not
whether the legislature had the power to give such right of action,
but whether the sections relied upon did give such a right of action. The
statutes of Wisconsin are not intended to confer upon non-resident
aliens rights of action not conceded to them or to us by their owrr
country or to put burdens upon our own citizens to be discharged for
the benefit of non-resident aliens. That Lord Campbell's Act has no extra
territorial force and that the plaintiff is not reasonably within the pur-
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view of it, and that while it is possible that the language of the statute
may admit of a construction which would include a non-resident alien hus-
band, etc., yet it is a construction so obviously opposed to the spirit and
policy of the statute that it cannot reasonably be adopted by the Wis-
consin Court.
In the case of Bouthson v. Phoenix Light and Fuel Co., 6i L. R. A.
563; 8 Arizona 129, the court, after a rather lengthy examination of
the decided cases, allowed a recovery, holding that there is no difference
between a statute authorizing a right of action merely declaratory of the
common law, in the absence of a specific restriction, and a statute which
grants rights not cognizable at common law.
There are various decisions like Philpott v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 85 Mo.
164, which touch upon the right of a representative or other person to
whom a statute has given the right, if a resident in one State, to main-
tain an action in another State. But since such decisions relate to citizen-
ship, and can possibly be grounded upon the constitutional regulations of
citizens of the several states, it is not considered that they affect the
question one way or the other.
In the case of Davidsson v. Hill, 2 K. B. 6o6 (goi), the right of re-
covery was allowed a non-resident alien, in an accident case occurring
upon the high seas. Nor does the fact that the accident occurred with-
out the kingdom appear to have affected the decision one way or the other.
It was stated that if the deceased had been merely injured and not killed,
then he clearly could have maintained an action. The object of the legis-
lation in question was that the wrongdoer should not escape liability by
killing his victim, and that primarily there is an imposition of a liability
upon British subject, even though the consequence may be to enlarge the
rights of foreigners. This case clearly abrogates the doctrine as laid down
in Adam v. Steamship Co., supra. The court, in an elaborate opinion,
attempts to draw a difference between the circumstances surrounding the
cases in which statements have several times been made to the effect
that Parliament legislates only for Great Britain, and since Parliament
can impose no obligations upon non-resident aliens, it cannot lawfully
confer rights, and the circumstances surrounding the case of Davidsson
v. Hill, supra,. The distinctions attempted, however, do not appear to
ring true.
So the cases stand, allowing the student no opportunity to draw a
hard, fast, positive rule. Yet, Davidsson v. Hill, supra, is convincing of
the fact that the courts in their zeal for the present day growing spirit
of humanity would overstep the strictly judicial provinces and infringe
upon the legislative field. For no matter how noble or how humane a
universal rule would be, it is for the legislative body to encroach upon the
old common law and not the duty of over-zealous courts however worthy
the motive.
